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The Clean
Water Act

Financing

Combined
Sewer Overflow
Projects

Clyde W. Barrow
William

Hogan

In 1987 Congress expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include combined sewer

overflows (CSOs) despite continuing to reduce federal assistance for water-pollution

abatement and despite the fact that
water-quality mandates.

As a

result,

CSO

abatement

is far

many low-income

more

costly than previous

deindustrializing cities are

now

mandate that many of them cannot afford without extensive federal or state assistance. The authors conclude that, in lieu of increased federal
funding for CSO abatement, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulatory guidelines and the Clean Water Act be amended to include an assessment of the fiscal and
economic impact of CSO mandates. Such action would provide a basis for targeting the
available resources where needs are greatest and the effect of CSO abatement is likely
subject to an additional federal

to result in tangible beneficial uses.

It is

the national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly

owned waste treatment works.

The Nature and Distribution

— Clean Water Act

of

Combined Sewer Overflows

In most U.S. cities, sewer lines and stormwater collection systems were
in the 1800s

of 1977

and early 1900s. Typically, sewer

urban residential areas and business

lines

were

districts

first

constructed

designed to carry raw sewage from

laid first.

These were followed by

stormwater drainage systems designed to collect rainwater during storms to reduce or
eliminate urban flooding. In

many

cases, sewer lines

and stormwater conduits were

connected into a combined sewer, namely, a single collection system that conveys both

sewage and stormwater.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates

that there are

more than

1,300 combined sewers in the United States serving approximately 1,100 communities

with a

total

population of 43 million people.

1

Combined sewers

are located primarily,

although not exclusively, in the Northeast and Great Lakes areas. Eleven states in these

two geographic areas account

for 85 percent of the water-quality problems attributed to

CSOs

l).

nationwide (see Figure

2

Only eight

states

account for 70 percent of the
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assessed construction needs for water-pollution abatement caused by combined sewer

overflows (see Figure

2).

3

In their earliest phase of development, sewer lines and stormwater collection

systems were designed to discharge directly into receiving waters such as

rivers, lakes,

bays, and estuaries. These plans were developed long before the adverse health and

environmental effects of such discharges were understood by
officials,

and the general public. However,

concern over such

effects, the

as part of an

scientists,

government

emerging public awareness and

U.S. Congress passed the U.S. Public Health Act and the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. Cities and towns that had not already done
so were required to build primary wastewater treatment
raw sewage before discharging it into receiving waters.

facilities to strain

and disinfect

In addition to the construction of primary treatment facilities, municipalities with

combined sewers encountered a derivative problem. Publicly owned treatment works
(POTWs) are designed to process normal dry-weather sewage flows that come to the
treatment facility from the collection system. During rainfalls, additional flows of
stormwater enter a combined sewer through street inlets. The combined sewage flow
and stormwater runoff often exceed the intake capacities of a POTW. Thus, if a
combined sewer can discharge only through the POTW, the treatment facility is
overloaded with stormwater and causes an extreme outfall of untreated combined
sewage into the receiving waters; to prevent an overload of the POTW, excess flows
may be contained in the collection system, where they back up and cause localized
flooding of combined sewage in residential areas and business districts.
The standard solution to the problem of excess combined flows has been to construct
diversionary chambers at key points throughout a collection system. As Figure 3 illustrates, the trunk lines of a combined sewer are generally routed into regulator chambers

Figure 3

CSO

Diversion

Chamber

To Publicly Owned
Treatment Works

CSO
Chamber
Outfall to Receiving

Waters

Wet-Weather Flows
Dry-Weather Flows

144

movable intercepUnder normal dry-weather conditions, raw sewage flows are diverted into lines that
carry them to the publicly owned treatment works where sewage is treated before being
that partially block outfalls to receiving waters with either a fixed or
tor.

discharged into receiving waters.

During a storm, the water level

combined sewer, and by design, the excess

rises in a

combined sewer flow (CSF) begins

to

overflow the interceptors and discharges directly

Combined sewer overflows

into receiving waters without treatment.

contain not only

untreated sewage, but stormwater runoffs entering the system gather dry- weather pollutants that

have accumulated on the

streets, in the gutters,

ings. In addition, dry-weather sediments that

pended

and on the roofs of build-

have accumulated

in the

sewers are resus-

combined flow increases with the rising volume of storm
untreated effluents of a combined sewer overflow often contain

as the velocity of

4

water. Therefore, the

unhealthy and environmentally dangerous levels of fecal matter, sediment, microorganisms, oil and grease, toxic metals, organic pollutants, and other storm debris. 5

The Federal Water

Pollution Control Act:

An

Evolving National Policy

The problem of water pollution caused by untreated or inadequately treated wastewater was revisited by the U.S. Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. This legislation established the fundamental principles and
objectives of a national wastewater management policy. Section 101(a) of that
legislation established an ambitious national mandate by declaring the following:
The Objective of this Act

is to

restore

and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective

hereby declared
(1)

it is

that,

consistent with the provisions of this Act

—

it is

the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters

be eliminated by 1985;
(2)

it is

the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality

which provides

for the protection

and provides for recreation
(3)

it is

(4)

it is

in

and propagation of

fish, shellfish,

and wildlife

and on the water be achieved by July

the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic

1,

1983;

amounts

be prohibited;
the national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct

publicly

owned waste treatment works.

To achieve these

goals, the Federal

1972 established a national program

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

to regulate the discharge of pollutants into surface

The legislation created a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), which requires point-source polluters to obtain a permit for discharges into

waters.

U.S. waters. Generally, point sources consist of industrial process wastewater outfalls

and sewage

NPDES

outfalls

require point-source dischargers to

6

The legislative guidelines for the
comply with specific technology-based

from municipal treatment

plants.

requirements. For instance, the effluent limitations for

all

publicly

owned

treatment

works are based on levels achieved by the implementation of secondary treatment. 7
Under the 1972 legislation, individual states can assume authority for the
administration of NPDES once their permitting processes are approved by the EPA. The
law requires that state water-quality standards be consistent with federal policy but, if
necessary to achieve the act's objectives, states are allowed to impose water-quality

145
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stringent than those required

operate EPA-approved

The 1972

NPDES

by

federal regulations. Thirty-eight states

permitting programs.

legislation explicitly linked the

achievement of national water-quality goals

by the new mandate (Section
Amendments of 1972 implemented

to federal financial assistance for municipalities affected

The Federal Water

101[a][4]).
this

Pollution Control Act

linkage by creating a Construction Grants Program (CGP) that provided deep

subsidies for the construction of publicly

owned

treatment works.

The EPA was charged

with administering the Construction Grants Program. Moreover, to provide guidance to

Congress in funding the CGP, the

EPA is

required to develop biennial estimates "of the

cost of construction of all needed publicly

(Section 516

owned

treatment works in each of the States"

[b]).

The Clean Water Act of 1977
The national water-quality goals established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 were incorporated unchanged into the Clean Water Act of 1977,
which otherwise extensively amended the earlier legislation. Significantly, for the first
time, section 70 of the Clean Water Act specifically directed the EPA to "report on the
status of combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works operations" by the
following year. Combined sewer overflows from publicly owned treatment works were
not covered explicitly by NPDES in either the 1972 or the 1977 legislation. NPDES
8

regulates point sources of water pollution, while scientists, engineers, and

EPA officials

considered combined sewer overflows to be nonpoint sources of pollution. Consequently,

it

was generally assumed

overflows were exempt from
specifically covered

by the EPA's

stormwater discharges from combined sewer

that

NPDES

permits and, for this reason,

original

NPDES

regulations.

CSOs were

never

9

Nevertheless, various legal challenges in the federal courts questioned the prevailing
interpretation of the regulatory status of

water and
that

CSO

had met the

POTWs

CSOs. The

federal courts recognized storm-

discharges as point sources of water pollution. Therefore, communities

NPDES

technology-based requirement for secondary treatment

were increasingly deemed subject

to legal

at their

and regulatory action for combined

sewer overflows that violated the water-quality standards established by the Clean Water

Act of 1977.
Congress made a major policy departure by embracing the federal courts' opinion

on

this

matter in the Water Quality Act of 1987. 10 Section 405 of the act amended

the earlier legislation to require

NPDES

compliance for any stormwater discharge "that

contributes to a violation of a water-quality standard or

is

a significant contributor

of pollutants to waters of the United States." In this regard, the legislation directed the

EPA to

establish permit application requirements regulating municipal stormwater

discharges.

September

The EPA issued a national combined sewer overflow control
1989. The strategy emphasizes, quite explicitly, that CSOs

8,

sources of pollution subject to

The

strategy, covering

criteria for

•

CSO control.

The

NPDES

strategy

on

are point

permits. 11

approximately 1,100 muni cipah ties, establishes three major

12

policy allows no

more than an average of four overflows per year
more than five in rural areas.

for an urban area, and no

146

•

The policy calls for treatment of at least 85 percent of the volume of the
combined sewage in the combined sewer system during rainfall events

•

The policy

on a systemwide average

basis.

establishes nine other

minimum

controls that prohibit

CSO

dis-

charges in dry weather, regulate solid materials, require proper mainte-

nance and monitoring of

CSO
The new

discharges.

CSO

facilities,

and require public notification of

13

CSO

control strategy also directed the individual states to develop statewide

permitting strategies by January

approval for their

CSO

1,

1990.

More

than thirty states had received

control strategies as of April 6, 1992.

EPA

14

Federal Funding of Water Pollution Abatement

The Federal Water
mandate

Pollution Control Act of 1972 established an ambitious national

improve water quality over a

to

amendments

relatively short period of time.

to the original legislation (1977, 1981)

goals, then extending those goals in 1987 to include the

overflows.

A crucial

component of the

Subsequent

have reiterated the same national

original national

problem of combined sewer
mandate was the establishment

of a "national policy that federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly

owned waste treatment works" (Section 101 [a] [4]).
As noted above, the 1972 act, Section 201(a), established

the Title

II

Construction

Grants Program to support "the development and implementation of waste treatment

management plans and
program provided

which will achieve the goals of this Act." Initially, the
federal grants to municipalities and special districts for the

practices

direct

construction of publicly

owned

treatment works, including

CSO projects.

The

federal

grants normally covered 75 percent of the cost of constructing the most cost-effective
alternative for providing the necessary wastewater treatment. 15

The 1972 and 1977

among

legislation allotted funds

from the Construction Grants Program

the individual states "in the ratio that the estimated cost of constructing all

needed publicly owned treatment works
construction of

all

in

each State bears to the estimated cost of

needed publicly owned treatment works

in all of the States" (Section

205 [a]). Each state's allotment under this formula was allocated directly to municipalities and special districts for individual construction projects on the basis of state priority

by each state. The federal regulations governing the EPA's ConstrucProgram specified that states were to rate individual projects within their
on the basis of four criteria: (1) severity of the pollution problem; (2) size

ratings developed

tion Grants
jurisdiction

of the population affected; (3) the need for preservation of high quality waters; (4)

at

the state's option, the category of need addressed. 16

The

categories of need consisted of secondary treatment,

more

stringent treatment,

correction of infiltration and inflow problems, sewer system replacement or major

new collectors and appurtenances, new interceptors and appurtenances,
and the correction of combined sewer overflow problems. 17 Each state was given sole

rehabilitation,

authority to determine the relative weight of each of the four criteria, as well as sole
authority to determine the priority of the various categories of need. Thus, whether a

given combined sewer overflow project
list

depended on

fell

within a fundable part of a state's priority

state policy.
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Furthermore, the

EPA stipulated

that

combined sewer overflow

projects could qualify

for federal grant assistance only if several additional criteria had been met:

•

The proposed

level of

CSO

control

was necessary

to protect a beneficial

use

of the receiving water even after technology -based standards had been

achieved by industrial point sources and

at least

secondary treatment had

been achieved for dry-weather municipal flows;
•

Secondary treatment of dry-weather municipal flows had been achieved, or
provision for funding of secondary treatment had already been made;

The proposed

•

other

CSO

CSO

control technique

would be more

cost effective than

control techniques or adding higher than secondary treatment

for dry- weather municipal flows;

The marginal

•

costs

were not substantial compared with marginal

benefits.

18

above, the Clean Water Act of 1977 directed the EPA to "report on the
combined sewer overflows in municipal treatment works operations" and to
conduct a CSO needs assessment based on current applications for CSO project funding
under the CGP. The act further stipulated that the report determine the number of years
necessary, "assuming an annual authorization and appropriation for the construction
grants program of S5,000,000,000, to correct combined sewer overflow problems" (33
U.S.C. 1375, Section 70[c]). Based on this fiscal assumption, the EPA estimated that it
would take a minimum of ten years to complete CSO control under optimal conditions
and perhaps as many as forty years to correct in some states. 19 However, in calculating

As noted

status of

these estimates the

EPA emphasized to

Congress and the president "the importance of

maintaining constant buying power in the construction grants program
is to

be achieved in a reasonable period of time." 20 In

fact, federal

if

CSO

correction

outlays for the

Construction Grants Program increased during the 1970s, but actual outlays never

reached the S5 billion promised by the 1977 legislation (see Figure

4).

CGP outlays

reached a peak of only S4.3 billion in fiscal year 1980 and have been declining since
that time.

Indeed, the Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant

Amendments of

1981 marked the beginning of a formal retreat in the federal government's financial

commitment to national water-quality goals. First, the amendments imposed a requirement that, effective October 1, 1984, no less than 80 percent of each state's CGP allotment "shall be made only for projects for secondary treatment or more stringent treatment, or any cost effective alternative thereto,

new

interceptors and appurtenances,

infiltration-in-flow correction" (33 U.S.C. 1281, Section 201[g][l]). This
tively

mandated secondary treatment

and

change effec-

as the top priority for the Construction Grants

Program, even as federal courts were bringing

CSO problems

under the jurisdiction

of the Clean Water Act.

The
tion.

effect of this

Beginning in

change was

fiscal

partially offset

by two other components of the

legisla-

year 1983, a separate appropriation of S200 million per fiscal

year was authorized specifically to address the water-quality problems of marine bays

and estuaries affected by discharges from combined stormwater and sanitary sewer
overflows. However, only 10 percent of U.S. combined sewer facilities affect marine

bays and estuaries. 21 The
allotment for

CSO

EPA was

authorized to use funds from a state's regular

construction projects, but only where the correction of

problems was deemed a major

priority in the state's ranking

system and only

requested to do so by a state governor (33 U.S.C. 1285, Section 201 [n]).

148
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CGP

Figure 4

Construction Grants Program:
Federal Outlays, Fiscal Years 1972 to 1980
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Source: Office of the President, The Budget of the United States Government: Appendix (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1973-1981)

Third, and most important, the Construction Grant

Amendments of 1981 reduced
owned treatment works from

the federal contribution for the construction of publicly

75 percent to 55 percent of construction

costs.

22

In addition, the 1981

amendments low-

ered the annual authorizations for the Construction Grants Program and, accordingly,
federal outlays for the construction of publicly

owned

treatment works began a steady

decline that has continued unabated for sixteen years, even though the original waterquality goals and mandates remain the

same

as in the 1970s (see Figure 5).

Congress clearly understood that the sharp and protracted decline in federal

assis-

tance initiated by the 1981 amendments would create difficulties for municipalities currently or potentially subject to federal court orders. Section
cited "the sense of the Congress that judicial notice should

the

amendments

to the Federal

26 of the 1981 amendments
be taken of this Act and of

Water Pollution Control Act made by

this

Act, including

reduced authorization levels under section 207 of such Act." While such decisions

remain within the discretion of individual judges and courts,

it

was unquestionably

the

intent of Congress that the judiciary take special notice of the hardship created for

municipalities by reduced federal funding. Consequently, Section 26 of the 1981 amend-

ments

directs that "parties to Federal consent decrees establishing a deadline, schedule,

or timetable for the construction of publicly

owned

treatment works are encouraged to

reexamine the provisions of such consent decrees and, where required by equity, to

make

appropriate adjustments in such provisions." 23
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Figure 5

Construction Grants Program:
Federal Outlays, Fiscal Years 1980 to 1992
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Source: Office of the President, The Budget of the United States Government: Appendix (Washington, D.C.
Printing Office, 1981-1993)

Government

Significantly,

even when federal funding levels were

tion Grants Program,

monies allocated

EPA needs

24

peak for the Construc-

assessments indicated that "the construction grant

to each region and state have never been sufficient to cover every

proposed project [even though] few sewage
assistance."

at their

Nevertheless, in

ments reduced the

CGP

its first

year

facilities

(FY

can be constructed without federal

1981), the Construction Grant

spending authorization to $3.9

the amendments, spending authorizations

billion. In the

fell steadily to

Amend-

time covered by

$2.9 billion in

FY

1988. 25

Overall, federal construction-related expenditures for sewage treatment facilities

dropped by 48 percent
that constant-dollar

in constant dollars

from 1980

to 1988, despite

buying power would have to be sustained

EPA warnings

to achieve federal water-

by the 1977 and 1987 legislation. 26
CSO projects had become the
largest unmet need in the federal Construction Grants Program even though Congress
mandated that secondary treatment be given top priority for funding. The EPA's most

pollution mandates within the time frame established

Moreover,

EPA needs

conservative estimate

assessments indicate that by 1985

is

that

CSO

control will require

more than $23

billion in capital

expenditures to reach the goals established by the Clean Water Act. 27
Nevertheless, the erosion of federal support for the construction of publicly

treatment works continued with the Water Quality Act of 1987.
authorization for construction of
billion in

FY

1988

to only

POTWs

$600 million

The

owned

federal spending

was reduced by another 75 percent, from $2.4
FY 1994. The act attempts to partially offset

in

150

:

the effect of these reductions on municipalities by mandating increased state contributions to the construction of treatment facilities.

The Water Quality Act enforced
state

the state

mandate by requiring the

states to create

water pollution control revolving funds (SRFs) by September 30, 1989. The act

authorizes annual federal appropriations to the SRFs, with each state's allotment defined
as a fixed percentage of the total annual federal appropriation for
in order to receive its federal allotment,

tion grant

each

state

all

SRFs. However,

must enter into a binding

agreement with the EPA. These agreements require a

state to

four dollars in federal allotments with one state dollar. Thus, each state

annually to provide
fund.

The

at least

must make

state

20 percent of the
its

capitaliza-

match every
is

expected

total capitalization for its state

revolving

contribution to the SRF, in quarterly installments, on or

before the date of the federal contribution. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier Construction Grants Program, the

below-market

SRFs

are authorized only to

Loan

to zero interest rates.

make

loans to municipalities at

recipients are required to establish a dedicated

source of revenue, usually sewer fees, for repayment of the loan. Annual principal and
interest

payments must commence no

and be fully amortized not

However,

as state

later

later

than one year after completion of the project

than twenty years after completion of the project.

governments plunged into

fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, they

increasingly slashed discretionary spending in order to balance budgets and to fund
entitlements. In fiscal years 1992

reductions.

28

and 1993, thirty-four

states

implemented spending

In this context, a recent National Conference of State Legislatures survey

of state legislative budget officers suggests that funding environmental projects has been
relegated to a fiscal nonissue as state governments seek to eliminate deficits, with

funding going to costly entitlement programs such as Medicaid, Aid to Families with

Dependent Children, K-12 education, and prisons. 29 One consequence of inadequately
financed state revolving funds is that more and more municipalities are locked in

EPA over mandated CSO

confrontations with federal courts and the

many

projects that

municipalities simply cannot afford to finance without extensive federal or

state assistance.

Indeed, the problem of unfunded

municipal issue that a special

CSO

CSO

mandates has become such a significant

Partnership was established by twenty-five

municipalities during the 1988 annual congress of the National

League of

Cities.

1989 one hundred twenty-five municipalities had joined the partnership in an
secure

more

flexible

By

effort to

CSO regulations and more federal funding to aid local compliance
CSO Partnership contends that under existing guidelines,

with those regulations. The

CSO

control will exceed the financial capacities of

many

older cities with a limited tax base and a plethora of
as schools

and

Case Study:

fire

municipalities, particularly

more pressing

capital needs such

and police protection. 30

CSO Abatement in Fall

River, Massachusetts

The city of Fall River, Massachusetts, a member of the CSO Partnership, illustrates the
dilemma faced by many old industrial and, increasingly, deindustrialized northeastern
cities where the most serious combined sewer overflow problems are concentrated in the
United States. Fall River, a coastal city with approximately 92,000 residents,
in southeastern Massachusetts about

is

located

twenty miles east of Providence, Rhode Island. The

history of wastewater treatment in Fall River closely parallels the national pattern of

wastewater

facilities

development. Fall River's original sewer system was designed and

757
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constructed in the years 1820 to 1850. For the most part,

its

current

combined sewer

system was constructed between 1910 and 1930. Until 1952 the combined system

dis-

charged untreated sewage and stormwater runoff directly into adjacent Mount Hope
Bay, the Quechechan River, and the Taunton River.
In response to the federal

mandates contained

in the U.S. Public

Health Act and the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Fall River constructed a publicly

primary wastewater treatment plant (1948-1952). The

facility

owned

provided primary

treat-

ment for normal dry-weather sewer flows and discharged the treated effluents into
Mount Hope Bay. Fall River's primary treatment facility was upgraded in 1961 and
1971. Finally, in compliance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, the city initiated the design and planning of a secondary wastewater treatment
facility. It

was constructed from 1979

to

1981, with 75 percent of the project's $36

million cost defrayed by the EPA's Construction Grants Program. Because an additional

15 percent of the construction cost was defrayed by the

state, Fall

River was required to

provide only 10 percent of the capital necessary to comply with the federal mandate.
Finally, during the last decade, the city voluntarily

ment program. 31 This

implemented an

industrial pretreat-

improvements to Fall River's wastewater treatment
process produced a system that complied with the water-quality standards established
under the water control amendments of 1972 and with the provisions of the Clean Water

Act of 1977. The

series of

most recent environmental study indicates that under dry- weathfrom the city's sewer system no longer disturb water quality

city's

er conditions, discharges

normal life of receiving waters.
However, because the Water Quality Act of 1987 defined combined sewer overflows
a point source of pollution, Fall River responded to changing federal policy by com-

sufficiently to affect the

as

missioning a Phase
Inc., in

November

I

CSO

1987.

facilities plan,

As

which was completed by the Maguire Group,

a result of findings reported in the plan, Fall River imple-

mented a further $12 million rehabilitation of its combined sewer to reduce infiltration
inflows to the system. The city also instituted new collection system controls that
include the routine cleaning of sewer lines to reduce back pressure and the addition
of weirs to the CSO structures to prevent outflows during low-flow periods. These
improvements have virtually eliminated dry-weather CSOs and limited CSO discharges
during periods of light rainfall. 32

Yet during moderate to heavy

rainfalls,

excess flows continue to build up in the com-

bined sewer and discharge, untreated, into receiving waters. Currently the
bined sewer has nineteen outfall points that discharge into

Quechechan River
tribute about

(4),

and the Taunton River

(2).

These

city's

Mount Hope Bay

com-

(13), the

outfalls are estimated to con-

941 million gallons per year of untreated wastewater

to the receiving

waters. 33 Fecal coliform is the

main pollutant discharged during Fall River's combined
sewer overflows, although the most recent study of their environmental impact indicates
that after a combined sewer overflow, fecal coliform levels in Mount Hope Bay return to
prestorm levels within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 34
Nevertheless, after the Environmental Protection

Agency released

its

combined sewer

overflow control strategy in August 1989, the anticipated change in administrative
policy placed Fall River in technical violation of

its

National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System permit, mainly because of the combined sewer overflows that occur
during moderate to heavy rainfall.
trative order to the city

tary

On September

29, 1989, the

EPA issued

an adminis-

of Fall River, citing the discharge of untreated storm and sani-

wastewater from the nineteen combined sewer outfalls as a violation of

752

its

NPDES

(MAO 100382). The administrative order required the city to submit a Phase II
CSO facilities plan to the EPA and to the Massachusetts Department of Environ-

permit
draft

mental Protection

(MDEP) by November

1,

assess alternative solutions to the Fall River
in conformity with

Phase

II

EPA

and

1990.

The Phase

CSO

problem and

MDEP planning

II

plan
to

was required

recommend

to

a solution

guidelines. 35

planning resulted in a recommendation that Fall River construct an off-line

deep-tunnel storage

facility.

The

consultant's

recommendation

is

to bore a 4.6 mile,

1

8-

foot-diameter tunnel 150 feet below ground, giving the tunnel a storage capacity of 48.3
million gallons. During periods of rainfall, excess

combined sewer flows would be

rout-

ed into the deep tunnel and stored so that combined flows neither overload the treatment
facility

nor discharge into receiving waters. Once rainfalls end and flow levels to the

treatment facility return to normal, excess wastewater stored in the deep tunnel would

be pumped

to the publicly

owned

treatment works, where

it

can receive primary and

secondary treatment. The proposed deep-tunnel storage alternative will not entirely
eliminate

combined sewer overflows, but

year, a level of

CSO

it

and the MDEP's combined sewer overflow
In the meantime, the city of Fall River
tion

Law

will reduce the

number of CSOs

CSO

abatement sufficient to comply with the EPA's

Foundation,

Inc.,

strategy.

was

also sued

by

the

New

for statewide

CSO

The

federal court's timetable

control established

March

acknowledges

CSO

abatement in the

state will take at least

that "the limitation in funds will be the

achieving water-quality standards in [the state's]

The

which

fa-

consistent with the schedule

twenty years. However, the document establishing the statewide

strategy also

Funding

is

11, 1992,

CSO

by the Massachusetts Department of Environ-

mental Protection, which estimates that
fifteen to

England Conserva-

under provisions of the Clean Water Act. The U.S. District

dictated a strict planning and construction timetable for the proposed
37

per

36

Court, District of Massachusetts, issued an enforcement order on

cility in Fall River.

to four

control policy

CSO

control

major obstacle

CSO impacted areas."

to

38

CSO Abatement

total capital cost

of the proposed deep-tunnel storage

estimated to be $115 million. This mandated cost

facility in Fall

River

is

imposed despite the fact that Fall
River remains in a chronic condition of economic and fiscal distress. 39 For instance, its
economy depends heavily on a declining manufacturing base that still accounts directly
for more than one-third of all the city's employment and wages. Since 1986, Fall
River's total employment base has declined by more than 7 percent, for a net loss of
2,659 jobs. This figure

is

is

roughly 50 percent higher than that for statewide job losses

during the same period; similarly, unemployment over the entire course of the

last

bus-

was approximately 50 percent higher than the statewide average. As of
March 1996, the city's unemployment rate was more than 14 percent and exceeded
19 percent during the trough of the 1990-1991 recession.
Not surprisingly, standard measurements of Fall River's fiscal capacity indicate that
the city's ability to raise revenue locally is far below average. First, Fall River residents
are among the poorest in the state of Massachusetts. Fall River's per capita income of
iness cycle

$10,966 (1989)

is

only 62 percent of the statewide average and ranks 348th of 351

Massachusetts municipalities. Similarly, Fall River's median household income of

$22,452 (1990)

is

only 54 percent of the statewide average and ranks 347th of the 351

municipalities. Second, while the

main own-source revenue
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for Massachusetts munici-
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palities is the property tax, Fall River's residential,

commercial, and industrial property

values are in a chronically depressed condition. In 1992, total assessed property values

per capita in Fall River were S30,752, or only 49 percent of the statewide average, that
is,

347th. Consequently, the city has been heavily dependent

because of the

20 percent

own

state's

fiscal crisis, this

on

state local aid; yet,

source of revenue declined by more than

after fiscal year 1989.

Despite the city's distressed economic condition and abnormally low fiscal capacity,
the expectations for federal and state assistance continue to diminish each year.

As

already documented, federal assistance for wastewater construction projects has been
declining for

more than

a decade, and current authorizations for spending under the

this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. At the
same time, state finances in Massachusetts, as elsewhere, are only beginning to emerge
from the severe fiscal crisis that began in 1989. 40 Indeed, recent analyses by state leg-

Water Quality Act indicate that

budget officers and others project that

islative

most

states for the near future.

41

state finances will

remain precarious

Finally, as a result of declining federal

and

in

state assis-

tance for water pollution abatement, the financial capacities of the Massachusetts state

revolving fund appear inadequate to support the numerous abatement projects eligible
for funding.

As previously

noted, passage of the Water Quality Act of 1987 dramatically altered

the Construction Grants

Program by

shifting the

main

responsibility for administering

wastewater treatment grants from the Environmental Protection Agency to the
revolving funds. In 1989, the

commonwealth of Massachusetts complied with

state

the

requirements of the Water Quality Act by creating a state revolving fund under Chapter

275 of the Massachusetts General Laws. The fund

Nationwide,

CSO

is

managed

(MWPAT) under the

Water Pollution Abatement Trust
Environmental Protection.

as the Massachusetts

Massachusetts Department of

abatement has been costing from SI, 300 to S2,500 per capita for

households served by a combined sewer system. 42 Thus, estimates based on these averages predict that

CSO

abatement in Massachusetts will require from S2.5 billion to

S4.9 billion in capital outlays over the next fifteen years and, in fact, the EPA's total

documented needs
Three

CSO

known
at

for

CSO

abatement in Massachusetts already exceed S2.7

projects alone, serving eleven of

—

its

billion.

43

twenty-six affected communities, have a

more than S2 billion
Boston/Massachusetts Water Resource Authority
SI. 6 billion, Lower Connecticut River Valley at S350 million, and Fall River at $115
cost of

million.

Hence, to meet the timetable established by the

MWPAT would need to advance
simply to address the

state's

state's

CSO

control strategy, the

approximately S300 million annually in capital outlays

CSO

problem. However, in

its first

four years the

MWPAT

received state and federal capitalization funds sufficient to issue only $120 million in
loans. The MWPAT's financial plan predicted that S661 million in new projects would
be funded through 1995, but nearly three-quarters (74%) of that sum was allocated to
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority for the Boston Harbor cleanup and to the
city of

New

Bedford for the construction of a secondary treatment

that the current

and anticipated resources of the

facility.

44

It is

evident

MWPAT are inadequate to meet CSO

water-quality mandates within a fifteen-year time frame, particularly since secondary

treatment remains a higher-level priority in the competition for limited funds.

As

a result, Massachusetts, like

many

states,

has gradually been shifting the costs

of federal water pollution mandates onto municipalities.
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The

state's original

SRF

guide-

45 percent grant equivalency awards for municipal water

lines established so-called

pollution abatement projects

MDEP's

state priority

deemed

A 45

list.

federally eligible and, therefore, entered on the

percent grant equivalency

is

achieved by advancing the

of a project as a loan to the municipality. Interest payments on the loan

full capital cost

are heavily subsidized

from reserve and equity funds controlled by the MWPAT and
payments made to the MWPAT by the state on behalf of

are

further defrayed by annual

municipalities with outstanding loans.

award appears
interest over

to the recipient to

The

effect of these subsidies

be a loan amortized

is

that a

45 percent

approximately 3 percent simple

at

twenty years.

Significantly, the Massachusetts

DEP's

original policy intent

was

75

to also provide

percent grant equivalency awards for priority-listed projects in so-called hardship communities.

A 75

percent grant equivalency

achieved by

is

cost of a project to the eligible municipality.

The

first

advancing the

full capital

MWPAT raises the grant from 45

per-

cent to 75 percent by forgiving 25 percent of the loan, effectively writing off this portion of the principal.

simple

The remaining

principal

repaid

is

at

near zero percent subsidized

interest.

When

Phase

I

CSO

planning of the Fall River

grants funding in 1983,

it

project

was approved

for construction

received, as a hardship community, an outright 90 percent

grant rather than a loan. Thus, as the project developed over the following decade,

was widely expected by
of the project

— Phase

ify for at least a

city officials, business leaders,

II

design and Phase

III

it

and citizens that the remainder

construction

— would continue

75 percent grant equivalency award under the

MDEP's

to qual-

hardship

provisions.

However, the original design and program guidelines for the

were premised on
up

in 1989.

As

fiscal conditions that

revolving fund

state

ceased to exist soon after the program's

guidelines were

amended

in

1992

to reduce the grant equivalency

awards available

the state's municipalities for water pollution abatement (Chapter 205, M.G.L.).

category for hardship communities was abolished.

45

Phase

II

to

The

Furthermore, projects remained

gible for 45 percent grant equivalency awards only if they
ority list before 1992. Thus, the

start-

MWPAT

the state's fiscal condition failed to improve significantly,

were placed on the

design costs for Fall River's

CSO

eli-

state's pri-

project

may

qualify for 45 percent grant equivalency assistance, but given other changes to the

MWPAT guidelines,

it is

quite definite that Fall River will not receive a similar equiva-

lency for the more costly Phase HI construction.

The 1992 Chapter 205 amendments reduced

MWPAT loans

from 45 percent

percent grant equivalency for projects placed on the state's priority

ward.

list

in

to

1992 or

25
after-

A 25 percent grant equivalency is achieved by decreasing the interest rate subsion MWPAT loans. Since the actual construction phase of Fall River's

dies provided

CSO project
cent award.

has been postponed by a court decision,

Under

this scenario, Fall

or raise property taxes

by 24 percent simply

that the project will

be funded either

MWPAT's own

fiscal capacities are

under

project entirely through

its

own

will qualify at best for a 25 pertriple its

to finance the

no guarantee

is

it

River would have to

in part or in

stress. If Fall

resources, the city

municipal sewer fees

CSO project.

River

is

its

However, there

entirety, since the

required to finance

would be required

its

to quintuple

municipal sewer fees or raise property taxes by 43 percent.
Consequently, as Fall River's

CSO

project has developed through

federal and state financial assistance have steadily withered away.

becomes more

costly in each succeeding stage as

755

it

its

various phases,

A CSO project

moves from Phase

I

planning to

New England Journal

Phase

II

of Public Policy

design to Phase

III

moving through each of these phases,
from a 90 percent grant for
likely 45 percent grant for the slightly more

construction. Yet, in

Fall River has encountered a steady decline in assistance,

the least expensive phase of the project, to a

expensive Phase
facility.

II

design, to a possible 25 percent grant for construction of the

Moreover, given the

that the city will

have

MWPAT's

fiscal constraints, there is

CSO

a strong likelihood

to finance all or part of the project through a municipal

bond

issue paid for with dedicated increases in municipal sewer fees or property taxes.

However, under

may be

River

which

law,
ues.

46

either scenario, calculations of projected debt ratio indicate that Fall

required to exceed even the emergency debt ceiling established by state

limits cities to a debt ratio of 5 percent of equalized assessed property val-

Thus, in order to comply with the federal

CSO

mandate, the city would have to

from the
Emergency Finance Board. Significantly, Fall River's Moody bond rating of
only Baal is already among the lowest in the state despite the city's merely average
violate state laws concerning municipal finance or obtain a special waiver
state's

per capita debt load.

Hence, in complying with the federal

bond

CSO mandate,

it is

quite possible that the

namely Bal or lower, and in using up
the city's available credit, the CSO project will crowd out approximately $100 million
in ready-to-go capital spending required to rebuild the city's ailing human and physical
city's

rating will fall to junk

infrastructure.

47

bond

status,

In effect, compliance with the federal court order could force Fall River

and police protection, and drinking water improvements to
combined sewer overflow abatement. Nevertheless, Fall River has been forced to
move forward on the CSO project according to a strict timetable established by the
U.S. District Court without regard to fiscal realities. As a result, the city is wedged
between the mandate of a national policy and the constraints of local economic and
to sacrifice schools, fire

fiscal conditions.

The Prospects

Any

for Fiscal Relief

realistic appraisal

officials

of federal and state fiscal policies suggests that municipal

cannot expect any significant relief from unfunded water-quality mandates in

the foreseeable future.

While a variety of

legislation is

pending

the state levels, this legislation, even if passed in toto, will

still

at

both the federal and

offer limited relief to

municipalities and ratepayers. Indeed, the structural gap between the costs of federal

water-quality mandates and the fiscal resources available to meet those mandates, which

continues to grow wider,

Pending

is

not likely to be closed during the remainder of the decade.

legislative initiatives that claim to offer relief consist of

financial assistance to municipalities for water-quality

assistance to sewer ratepayers through individual tax subsidies.
direct-relief initiative

pending

at

the federal level

is

two

types: (1) direct

improvements and

The most

(2) indirect

significant

a reauthorization of the

Quality Act, which had been expected to pass Congress by the end of 1994.

expected that the reauthorization,

if it

ever moves forward, will contain

Water
It is

widely

at least three

significant changes involving the financing of water-quality mandates. 48 First, the
act

was expected

new

to provide an initial federal authorization to the state revolving funds

FY 2000. Thus, if
Congress actually appropriates the full amount authorized by the Water Quality Act of
1994, and if individual states fully match the federal appropriation, the SRFs would
receive an additional $35 billion in capitalization by the end of the decade. Second, the
of $2.5 billion with the authorization increasing to $5.5 billion by
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new

communities" defined as municipalwhich sewer rates exceed a fixed percentage (most likely 1 .25%; of median
household income. Under the proposed language, state revolving funds will be allowed
act will also create a special class of "hardship

ities in

to
if

make

negative-interest-rate loans, in effect a partial grant, to hardship communities,

a state legislature passes separate legislation authorizing

its

SRF

to grant negative-

SRFs

interest-rate loans. Finally, the

new

repayment period from twenty

to thirty or forty years for hardship

act will probably authorize

tively reducing the annual outlays of the affected municipalities

to

extend the loan

communities, effec-

by 25 percent or more,

although the total debt load will not be affected by this provision.

While such changes are an important step in the right direction, several caveats are
Congress has indicated its intent to withdraw from any further financing of
water-quality improvements once the reauthorized Water Quality Act expires in FY
2000. By that time, Congress insists that the SRFs are to be fully self-financing revolving funds capable of meeting water-quality mandates without additional federal assistance. However, the simple fact is that capitalization of the SRFs will not be sufficient
to meet the cost of existing water-quality mandates based on EPA estimates. The EPA's
most recent needs survey concludes that the known cost of meeting existing mandates
in order.

under the Clean Water Act will be $137.1 billion over the next twenty years. Combined
49
sewer overflow projects alone will require $41.2 billion during the same period. So

even

if

Congress and the

Water Quality Act,

$102

billion (of

it

states appropriate the full

will

still

$35

billion

expected under the

leave an unfunded water-quality mandate of

which CSOs are the single

new

more than

largest component).

Thus, the act will not fundamentally resolve the problem of unfunded water-quality
mandates. Consequently, unless key state governments plug the $102 billion structural
gap,

many

municipalities

may

receive no

SRF

assistance, or insubstantial amounts, for

otherwise SRF-eligible projects simply because of inadequate federal funding. Massachusetts has
years. In

FY

made some

effort to increase direct assistance during the last

two

fiscal

1994, the state appropriated an additional $30 million in direct grants to the

(MWRA) for rate relief in the forty-three comFY 1995, the state approved an additional $50 million, including
million for non-MWRA ratepayers. These special appropriations have helped to

Massachusetts Water Resource Authority
munities

$10

it

serves.

For

slow the pace of rate increases in

MWRA communities, but total state assistance

minuscule compared with the $7.7 billion in

—

total

documented needs

— $2.7

is still

billion for

by the EPA. 50
Not surprisingly, as this structural gap continues to unwind, elected officials are
being pressured toward additional responses by a burgeoning ratepayers' revolt. Various
proposals for indirect tax relief have been proposed that aim to subsidize individual
ratepayers in municipalities burdened by water-quality mandates. For example, in 1993
Massachusetts amended its SRF statute to allow municipalities with enterprise funds
a minority of the state's towns and cities
to repay the capital costs of SRF loans with

CSOs

identified for Massachusetts

—

—

property tax revenue rather than sewer fees. 51 This change covertly effects a federal sub-

by making individual ratepayers eligible to use the properon federal personal income taxes as a way of defraying the costs of

sidy through state legislation
ty tax deduction

sewer construction.
Significantly, however, such a

change offers no

relief to the vast majority of rate-

most taxpayers do not itemize deductions
on the federal income tax form. Similarly, Massachusetts senators Edward Kennedy and
John Kerry have proposed federal tax legislation that allows individuals to deduct from

payers, even in eligible communities, because
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personal income taxes those portions of sewer and water

bills

which exceed one percent

52
of adjusted gross income. This proposal suffers from the same problem as the state

plan, unless

somehow

it is

structured differently from the existing property tax deduc-

tion to allow the deduction without itemization. Hence, nothing

on the existing

legisla-

agenda offers much promise of substantial relief for municipalities or ratepayers.
Indeed, at this point, it is not even clear whether Congress will reauthorize the Water
tive

Quality Act.

Assessing the Cost of Compliance

A national policy that ignores local economic
when

and

the local

economic and

fiscal

be reasonable

fund the mandate. In the

past,

impact of federal water-quality mandates was mitigated by

deep federal subsidies, particularly capital grants,

from a

may

fiscal capacities

that policy includes a substantial effort to federally

local standpoint. Furthermore, previous

that alter the cost-benefit equation

mandates for primary or secondary

treatment were far less costly than the available options for controlling combined sewer
overflows. For most municipalities,

CSO

construction of secondary treatment

facilities.

of 1987 and the

EPA CSO

abatement costs
53

many

times more than the

In this respect, the

control strategy have

imposed

far

more

Water Quality Act
costly mandates than

in the past during a period of declining federal assistance.

In this context, declining federal subsidies, uncertain state finances, a
base, and a

weak

construction of

However,

local

CSO

economy can

facilities, particularly for

until recently there has

weak

local tax

drastically shift the cost-benefit equation for the

been

little

declining and deindustrializing

cities.

concern for the economic and financial

calculations of municipalities to the extent that

EPA regulations and

court decisions

have consistently enforced a water-quality standards approach to the

CSO problem in

the United States.

CSO benefit

According to the EPA's own

analysis guidelines, the water-quality

standards approach "assumes that certain water-quality standards are associated with the
protection of water uses

.

.

.

although the connection

may

not always be scientifically

defensible." 5" Instead, biochemical water-quality standards establish regulatory guidelines as a surrogate

measure of benefits, irrespective of whether any real marginal cost

benefits are realized by a local

community subject

to those standards. Interestingly,

EPA

guidelines require communities to assess the comparative cost-benefit ratio of different

CSO

abatement options

after the federal

mandate has been imposed, but the

guidelines do not require an analysis of whether the mandate itself

is

statutory

economically and

fiscally feasible for a particular municipality.

However, because

it is

unlikely that significantly increased federal funding will be

forthcoming any time soon,

it

is

necessary to establish criteria for allocating and target-

ing the limited resources available to those municipalities

whose maximum

water-quali-

improvement may occur with a minimum of economic and fiscal cost to municipalities. Such criteria would allow for flexible enforcement of the CSO control strategy
along a continuum that would permit the postponement, delay, or extension of high-cost
ty

CSO

projects that are unlikely to produce

any significant beneficial use from the

pated water-quality improvements. Such decisions would be greatly enhanced

if

antici-

federal-

level environmental impact statements and state-level environmental impact reports

were considered by regulators and judges
impact statement.

in conjunction with
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an economic and

fiscal

The U.S. Environmental

Agency took a significant step in this direction in
new combined sewer overflow control policy. It was

Protection

April 1994 in the final draft of

its

released to clarify the enforcement standards and implementation of EPA's 1989 strategy.

Although the new policy

still

based and water-quality-based

requires municipalities to

CSO

comply with technology-

standards "as soon as practicable," for the

first

time enforcement schedules are to be developed that consider financial feasibility for
municipalities in addition to the long-standing criterion of physical feasibility, that

technology-based standards. Thus, on publication of the
administrator Carol

CSOs and

their

M. Browner noted

that

it

new CSO

control policy,

"recognizes the site-specific nature of

impacts and provides the necessary flexibility to tailor controls to

local situations."

55

Nevertheless, the EPA's

new

regulatory guidelines apply only to the issuance of

NPDES

permits and to

are

not required to consider financial feasibility, and the federal court had until

still

is,

EPA

EPA

administrative orders. 56 Federal courts, as in Fall River,

recently been unwilling to consider any criterion other than physical feasibility in the

development of an implementation schedule. Hence,
flexible enforcement of

CSO

at this point the

mandates and the federal court's

literal

EPAs

increasingly

enforcement of the

CSO mandate are creating two separate standards: a strict standard for municipalities
where private environmental groups have filed suit in federal court and a flexible standard for all other municipalities. The next logical step toward resolving these conflicting
standards would be to incorporate the EPA's new CSO control policy, particularly its
references to financial feasibility, into the Water Quality Act. Furthermore, the requirement that an economic and fiscal impact statement be weighed in the development of
any court-ordered enforcement schedule would

at least

introduce additional considera-

would both encourage and allow greater flexibility in
to which the CSO mandate should be implemented in

tions into judicial proceedings that

deciding the speed and the extent
particular municipalities.
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